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Article 6

Keynote Address
RODERICK E. WALSTON*

INTRODUCTION

I really appreciate the opportunity to speak at this wonderful
conference. I think this conference will be very successful in the future as
a result of the timeliness of the issue of water law. You are all beginning
to learn by your attendance at this conference what it took me an entire
career to learn: Water law is truly a very exciting and challenging field of
law to practice.
Water law is especially important in California and the West because
our natural water supply is insufficient for our population. As a result of
the scarcity of water, water law is linked with public policy considerations
in a way that other areas of law are not. How and where we distribute
our water determines in large part which areas and industries will grow
and which will not. It also determines the balance between our
environmental quality and our domestic and agricultural growth. Former
California Governor Pat Brown, who was responsible for developing
much of California's water infrastructure, once told me that water issues
were by far the most interesting problems he ever encountered. He also
said that water issues are most important because they are going to have
the biggest effect on California's future.
In California today, we see the importance of water law issues
everywhere around us. We are "submerged" in water issues. How much
water should flow from northern California to southern California? How
should we balance environmental preservation against economic growth?
How should we plan for future water supplies for the growing population
of California? These questions are at the centerpiece of water law today
and will remain the centerpiece for generations to come.
During my career, I have been fortunate enough to see water law
* J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Columbia University; Of Counsel, Best Best & Krieger LLP.
Mr. Walston has extensive experience in the areas of natural resources and environmental law, having
served both as a litigator for state regulatory industries and as a manager of litigation for federal and
state agencies in these areas. He has particular expertise in water rights and water quality laws. Prior
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from many different perspectives. I have spent most of my career in
government service, and now I am in the private sector. While in
government, I spent most of my career in the California Attorney
General's office, and then eventually with the U.S. Department of the
Interior in Washington, D.C. I have worked on both sides of the
federal/state fence and the public/private fence. In fact, I have been on
both sides of many fences. This gives me a unique perspective. Actually,
I found that I was able to take many of the briefs that I wrote when I was
in the Attorney General's office and simply use them when I moved on
to do work with the federal government. I just had to insert the word
"not" in a lot of sections.
In many ways, water law reminds me of an egg because what it
means depends on the eye of the beholder. When a mother hen looks at
an egg, she sees a chick, whereas a rooster sees his virility, and a farmer
sees his breakfast. In the same way, water law means different things to
different people.
To environmentalists, water law is the way to preserve our natural
resources-to preserve fish in the Delta, salmon in the ocean, and maybe
even a way to drain Hetch Hetchy. To cities, farmers, and developers,
water law is a way to develop and grow our economy and industry, to
build the "shining city on the hill," to produce foods that will be
marketed in California and throughout the world, and to sustain growing
populations.
Bill Mulholland, who was the architect of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct, which brings water from Owens Valley to Los Angeles,
summarized this point at the Aqueduct's opening ceremonies.' When the
first water poured out of the Aqueduct, he said to the people of Los
Angeles: "There it is. Take it."2 That was his view; the water was there
for the taking.
These different perspectives all have some validity (perhaps some
more than others) because water serves many purposes in our society.
My own perspective of water law has been shaped by my long career in
government service. Based on my government career, I am more inclined
to see water law through the prism of federalism, as a way to determine
the balance between federal and state power and how they regulate
water, a way to define the role of the federal government and the states
in our constitutional system. From this perspective, the issue is not so
much who wins (as between environmentalists and water users) but
rather who decides. While I am not agnostic on how water is used, I
respect the institutions that have been created to make these decisions.
i.The Aqueduct opened on November 5, 1913. William Mulholland, Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power Biography, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwpooi562.jsp.
2. Id.
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As a government lawyer, my job was to make sure that the right
institution made the decisions, that it followed the right process, and that
it applied the right laws.
During my presentation today, I will discuss issues of federalism in
the field of water law, particularly in terms of how they arise before the
United States Supreme Court and are decided by the Court. This is a
very timely topic because the nature of our federalism is being much
debated across the land today. The Supreme Court itself is engaged in
this debate. The Court has issued recent decisions that have defined the
relationship between the federal government and the states in our
constitutional system, and these decisions have enormous ramifications
for water law. To be sure, the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been
unsteady and uneven. Some people say that the Court is in the midst of a
federalism revolution that is going to continue; others say that the
revolution is over, and still others say it never occurred.
The Court has a case on its docket right now that raises federalism
issues in water law, and its decision may clarify the federal and state roles
in regulating water.3 Additionally, there are other cases lurking out there
that may work their way to the Supreme Court. This is an exciting time
to be practicing in the field of water law.
I. BACKGROUND: FEDERALISM IN WATER LAW
To understand federalism in water law, you need to have basic
understanding of how our water laws came about. Indeed, our water laws
are the product of our own history, much more so than in many other
areas of law. In the beginning, the states controlled all navigable and
non-navigable waters. After the American Revolution, the King of
England's sovereign powers went to the states, and the states had all the
power. When new states, like California, came into the Union, they were
on equal footing with other states, receiving sovereign control of their
waters.
The Constitution delegates a substantial amount of power to the
federal government. One of the powers is the power to regulate
interstate commerce. It is this power that provides basis for laws like the
Endangered Species Act,4 the Clean Water Act,' and other acts that
regulate our environment at the national level. But the states have
otherwise retained control of the right to regulate the actual use of the
water within their boarders. For their part, the states have adopted two
kinds of water rights laws-riparian laws and appropriation laws.

3. Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued,
Feb. 21, 2006).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2oo6).
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Most eastern states recognize riparian rights. The riparian right is an
incident of land ownership-the right belongs to the land. If you own
Blackacre, you have the right to use water that flows across your land.
The right attaches to the land.
In the West, the experience was different and a different system
developed. The early miners developed a custom of diverting water from
land they did not own to mining claims. The federal government owned
the lands across which the water was running, and the miners felt free to
divert the water. This simple custom, which developed in the gold mining
camps in eastern California, ripened into the doctrine of appropriation.
This is the prevalent water law of the West today. Under this doctrine,
the right to use water depends on the right to put it to beneficial use. The
priority of the right depends on the simple principle of "first in time, first
in right." Remember this as the same principle that controlled the line
for the high-school drinking fountain.
Today, the appropriation doctrine is the basic water law that allows
water to be transported from rivers in eastern California to coastal cities
like Los Angeles and San Diego. This is an example of how water law
follows public policy: Where water is plentiful (as in the East), water
rights attach to the land; where water is scarce (as in California), rights
depend on how the water is used. As a result, America has a water law
system unlike any other in the world. It is the product of our unique
history. The federal government has the right to regulate interstate
commerce, which allows it to regulate water for some purposes (e.g.,
protecting endangered species), but the states regulate the right to use
water itself.
These different federal and state systems sometimes come into
conflict. One major conflict arose in California several years ago over
whether state water laws applied to federal reclamation products. In
6
1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act, which authorizes the
federal government to build federal water projects all over the West.
These projects, like the Central Valley Project in California,7 have
developed much of the West's water supply. The Reclamation Act
contains a provision which requires the federal government to comply
with state water laws. Under this provision, California's State Water
Resources Control Board imposed some rather Draconian conditions on
the New Melones Dam, a federal project.9 These conditions, among other
things, require that water be released from this project to protect

6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-586 (2006).

7. See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (discussing the endeavors of the
Central Valley Project).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006).

9. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 647.

June 20061

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

downstream water quality." The federal government was very unhappy
with the conditions, so they challenged them in court, claiming that states
do not have the right to control abuse of water over reclamation dams."
Indeed, the Supreme Court issued several decisions during the 1950s
upholding the argument that states cannot control federal water uses."
In 1978, the Court returned to those prior decisions and, while not
explicitly reversing them, moved in the opposite direction. In California
v. United States, the Court held that the federal government has to
acquire its water rights under state law."' Moreover, the Court held that
the federal government must comply with conditions that the states
attach to water rights.' 4 In retrospect, the Court's decision in 1978 was
one of the earliest articulations of the fundamental reshaping of the
balance of power between the federal government and the states to
regulate water in the West. Under this restructuring of the law, the Court
began to pay more deference to state water laws than it had in the past.
Then-Justice Rehnquist noted that the "consistent thread of purposeful
and continued deference to water law by Congress" is one of the
hallmarks of Congress' reclamation policy.'5 This does not mean that the
states always win, in fact, they often do not. However, it does mean that
state interests are considered and given more weight than they were
prior to that decision.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND FEDERALISM
In the late i96os and early 197Os, Congress enacted several laws that
provided for environmental protection at the national level. These laws
include the Clean Water Act, 6 the Clean Air Act, 7 the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),' 8 the Endangered Species Act, 9
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of i98o,20 Superfund,"' and many others. These laws are

responsible for flooding our legal lexicon with acronyms. For example, a
recent Ninth Circuit opinion included the sentence "The CEQA requires
Io. Id.
ii. Id.
12.

See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (reversing a state court

decision that refused to recognize contracts entered into pursuant to the Reclamation Act); United
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (finding that congressional control of water use
superceded state authority).
13. California v. United States, 783 U.S. at 678-79.
i4. Id.

15. Id. at 653.
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (2oo6).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (2oo6).
i8. Id. 88 4321-4370 (2oo6).

19. 16 U.S.C.

§§

1531-1544 (2006).

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 96o-9675 (2oo6).
21.

The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, ioo Stat. 613 (1986).
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an EIR rather than an EIS, which is required under NEPA."2" This
moved the court to comment that "acronyms are not required by any
federal statute but seem to be the preferred -lexicon of environmental
law. '2 3 So if environmental law is a field you intend to enter, you need to
know your acronyms. In any event, some of these environmental laws
raise very important federalism issues. This is especially true of the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. I would like to discuss some
of the issues arising under these two acts in just a little more detail.
A.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT

The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes permit programs that
regulate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. 4 One permit
program regulates pollutant discharges from point sources and another
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to exercise permit authority
over all discharges from dredge and fill operations in navigable waters.25
Congress did limit the intrusion of this federal act into the states'
traditional areas of responsibility. Most importantly, the CWA does
allow the states to take over their own National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) programs. 6 California was the first state to
do this. In fact, to date almost every state has taken over its own NPDES
program.
Congress also limited their intrusion upon state sovereignty by
providing that the permit programs apply only to navigable waters.27 Why
did Congress do that? The answer is that the Constitution gave Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce, and with that power came the
power to regulate navigable waters. This leaves to the states the power to
regulate everything else, which is to say, non-navigable waters. However,
Congress muddied these waters by defining the term "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States. ' s The term "navigable waters" is very
limited and discreet, whereas the term "waters of the United States"
could potentially include every body of water in the United States. This
is one example of a situation where Congress provided a definition that is
less clear than the term it defines.
The major question is whether the broad, amorphous term "waters
of the United States" includes wetlands. Wetlands are swamps, bogs, and
marshes around the nation that support various types of water fowl and
migratory birds. The question is whether the federal government has the

22. Laub v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 342 F.3d io8o, io83 (2003).
23.

Id.

24. 33 U.S.C. § 125i(a) (2006).

Id. § 1252.
26. Id. § 1252(C).
25.
27.

Id.

§ 1252(C)(3).

28. Id. § 1362(7).
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power to regulate these wetlands under the CWA. It raises an even
broader question: Whether the federal government has the right to
regulate non-navigable waters under the CWA. Remember, nonnavigable waters have been traditionally regulated by the states. The
Supreme Court has issued two decisions that touch on this question and
partially resolve the issue. In a 1985 case, United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court held that the federal government can
regulate wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters. 9 The Court went
the other way about five years ago in the Solid Waste Agency case,
holding that the federal government cannot regulate isolated waters.3"
Isolated waters are wholly separated from navigable waters, having no
connection to them at all. What about the vast bulk of wetlands that fall
between these extremes? These wetlands are isolated in that they are not
adjacent to navigable waters; however, they are connected to navigable
waters remotely, and therefore not completely isolated.
That is the question in a pair of consolidated cases currently pending
before the Court: Rapanos v. United States3 and Carabell v. United
States.32 In Rapanos, the Army Corps of Engineers undertook to regulate
wetlands that are connected very remotely to navigable waters.33 The
wetlands were located about twenty miles from a navigable lake.3" In
Carabell,the Army Corps of Engineers undertook to regulate wetlands
that were separated from navigable waters by a spoil berm and thus not
connected to navigable waters at all.35 No water from the wetlands in the
Carabellcase ever reached the nearest body of "navigable waters," which
was a lake about one mile away.36 In both cases, the wetlands have no
apparent effects on the navigable waters or on interstate commerce,
which is, of course, the lynchpin in Congress' power to regulate. The
Court's decisions in these two cases will tell us a great deal about how far
the federal government can go in regulating non-navigable waters (like
wetlands) that have been traditionally regulated by the states.
The Rapanos and Carabell cases were argued before the Court on
February 21, 2006. These cases were the first environmental and water
cases heard by the Court since Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
took their positions on the Court. Not only will these cases provide
insight on how the Court views these broad issues of federalism, but they
29. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
30. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001).

31. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 20o4), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb. 21, 2006).
32. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F. 3 d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
415 (argued, Feb. 21, 2006).
33. Rapanos,376 F-3d at 632-33.
34. Id. at 642.
35. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705.
36. Id. at 705-06.
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will also help us learn how the two new members of the Court view these
issues.
B.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) appears to be having a larger
impact on state water laws and private rights than any other piece of
federal legislation. Unlike the CWA, the ESA makes no
accommodations for state sovereignty. Congress' goal was to protect
endangered species regardless of the effect on state and local laws. In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that
Congress' goal was to protect endangered species "whatever the cost."37
The ESA requires federal agencies to consult with federal service
agencies before they take any action that may impair endangered
species.38 After the consultation, the federal service agency then makes

recommendations with the intent of avoiding jeopardy to the species.39
The federal agency must comply with these recommendations or risk
criminal sanctions.4' The ESA also prohibits any individual, any state, or
even the federal government itself, from killing, endangering, impairing,
or injuring, an endangered species without a special permit issued by the
Secretary of the Interior."'
The ESA has a major impact on state water laws and private rights
because the ESA often requires that federal action agencies re-allocate
water in order to protect endangered fish, even though state laws may
have already allocated that same water for private use. This is where the
conflict arises. The ESA also has major impact on local land use
regulation because it prevents local governments from approving local
residential or commercial development in areas where endangered
species live. I am not going to address whether these effects are good or
bad, or what should be done about them; I simply note that they do exist.
The ESA has a major impact in California because most of the
endangered species listed by Secretary of the Interior are found in two
states-Hawaii and California.4" The ESA is probably one of nation's
most popular environmental laws passed by Congress, and, as a result, it
will likely prove one of the most difficult for Congress to amend. It is
also one of the most controversial laws passed by Congress because of
the major impact it has on private land use and states rights. Today
Congress is considering amending the ESA to resolve some of these
37. 437 U.S. 153, 183 (I978).
38. I6 U.S.C. § 1536 (2oo6).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 1533. These permits are very difficult to obtain.
42. The Endangered Species Listing Program,
index.html#species (last accessed Apr. i6, 2006).

http://www.fws.gov/endangered/listing/
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concerns.
The ESA does raise one interesting legal question that cannot be
summarized more simply than this: Is the ESA constitutional? To be
sure, the Court would never invalidate the whole ESA under any
circumstances. However, the question of whether the ESA is
constitutional as applied to a specific species is another matter. The ESA
was enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce powers, but was not
enacted for the purpose of regulating commerce. It was enacted to
regulate and protect species. The constitutional issue is whether
Congress' regulation of endangered species can be squared with
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
To date, four federal circuit courts of appeal have considered
whether the ESA is constitutional in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions. All four decisions ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the
ESA as applied to the species in those cases. These four decisions
involve: (i) an endangered fly in southern California called the "Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly;"'43 (2) endangered red wolves that the
Secretary of the Interior reintroduced in North Carolina and Tennessee; '
(3) endangered cave bugs and spiders in Texas; 5 and (4)the endangered
Arroyo Toad in southern California (San Diego County). 46
Although these four decisions upheld the constitutionality of ESA,
the reasoning of the decisions varied greatly. Every one of these
decisions had vigorous dissenting opinions-some written by judges who
are on the short list for the next appointment to the Supreme Court.
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts (while sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals) wrote one of the dissenting opinions. Justice Roberts noted
that it was difficult to see how a "hapless toad that, for reasons of its own,
in southern California" can be said to affect interstate
lives entirely
47
commerce.
The Court has followed a very uneven path in deciding these
constitutional issues. Since the 1930s, the Court has broadly construed
Congress' commerce powers. In fact, the Court never struck down a
congressional enactment on the grounds that it went too far. The Court
always deferred to Congress' judgment that it was regulating interstate
commerce. In two recent cases, however, the Court went the other way
and held that Congress' constitutional powers to regulate commerce are
limited and courts do not have to automatically defer to Congress. The
Court found that there had to be a separate determination as to whether

43. NAHB v. Babbitt, 13o F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
44. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
45. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
46. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3 d lO62 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
47. Id. at 116o (Roberts, J.,
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the regulated activity actually has an effect on interstate commerce. The48
two seminal cases that established this rule are United States v. Lopez
(which involved regulation of guns near schools), and United States v.
Morrison49 (which involved the Violence Against Women Act). In both
cases, the Court determined that Congress went too far.5
More recently, however, the Court went the opposite direction in a
marijuana case that came out of California.' In Raich, the Court held
that Congress can regulate local marijuana use and deferred to Congress'
judgment that regulation of local marijuana use is related to interstate
commerce. 2 There is no question that the Court will have to resolve this
constitutional issue in the context of whether the ESA is constitutional as
applied to an individual species. This is a looming question that the
Court will probably take up in the near future, especially considering that
at least one of the members of the Court is now on record raising the
issue.
Let me give you an idea of how courts are looking at this
constitutional issue in different ways. Essentially, courts have come up
with three different models for determining whether endangered species
affect interstate commerce:
(i) Whether the endangered species, by itself, significantly affects
interstate commerce. Under this model, a purely local species may have
no effect on interstate commerce, and therefore may not be subject to
federal regulation under the ESA.
(2) Whether the endangered species-in combination with all other
endangered species found anywhere -significantly affects interstate
commerce. Under this approach, all species (endangered or not) are part
of nature's biodiversity, and if you remove one part, you threaten the
entire system. Biodiversity does affect interstate commerce. This
approach allows courts to find that even purely local species may affect
interstate commerce.
(3) Whether the actor-the person whose activities threaten the
endangered species-is engaged in interstate commerce. Here, the focus
is on the actor (who is the subject of regulation), rather than the species
(which is the object of regulation). Under this approach, a regulation will
almost always be valid, because the actor is usually a developer and
development always has an effect on interstate commerce. However, not
all actors are engaged in commercial activity. For example, a lone hiker
in the woods or a homeowner landscaping his property may chance upon
48. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
49. 529 U.S. 598 (2ooo).
50. Morrison,529 U.S. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
51. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
52. 125S. Ct. at2211.
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the last member of an endangered species. The actor is presumably not
engaged in any commercial activity and, as a result, would have the right
to destroy the last member of the species with impunity.
This is a difficult constitutional issue. On one hand, there are
important reasons for protecting endangered species. On the other,
Congress' protection of such species cannot be easily reconciled with its
power to regulate interstate commerce. As a result, these cases raise
questions concerning extent of Congress' power to regulate water, and to
regulate the environment generally. To date, the Court has not reviewed
any case involving the constitutionality of the ESA, but the Court will
likely have to address this issue in the future.
III. INTER-BASIN TRANSFERS
Another major federalism issue is whether federal permit programs
of CWA apply to western water projects. Generally, permit programs
apply to anyone who "adds" pollutants to "waters of United States."53
The question then arises: When a water project transfers water between
different water basins, and that transfer includes pollutants that reach the
second basin, has the project "added" pollutants to "waters of the United
States"? This issue is of paramount importance in the West. Western
water projects, such as the Central Valley Project in California,54 typically
transfer water between basins in providing water supplies. Often the
transfers contain some pollutants that are added to the second basin.
These projects generally acquire water rights - including right to transfer
water between basins-under state law. However, if the CWA applies to
inter-basin transfers, projects may have to get permits under the CWA,
and the conditions attached to the permits may trump conditions
imposed under state water rights laws. Superficially, it would seem that
projects must get CWA permits in order to transfer water containing
pollutants to other basins. When water is transferred, the pollutants are
introduced into the second basin-and thus "added" to that basin. The
CWA contains another provision, section ioi(g),55 which limits the Act's
intrusion into state water laws. Section ioi(g) provides that the Act shall
not supersede a state's authority to "allocate" quantities of water within
its jurisdiction. 6 Thus, section ioI(g) appears to create an exemption
from permit requirements for western water projects, because they
"allocate" water.
The Supreme Court considered this issue two years ago, in a case

53. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2o06).

54. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, io6 Stat. 4706
(1992).

55. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2006).

56. Id.
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arising out of the Florida Everglades. 7 This case was not a good vehicle
to decide the meaning of section Ioi(g) because the Florida project
transferred water for conservation and flood control purposes, not for
the purpose of allocating water among different users (as is the case in
most western projects). Nevertheless, the Court was fully aware of
importance of the section Ioi(g) issue. During oral argument, Justice
Breyer speculated aloud (without asking a question) that if the Court
rules one way, it may allow degradation of "pristine" bodies of water; but
if it rules the other way, it may interfere with Congress' policy of
exempting western water projects."' The Court did not decide the issue,
and instead remanded the case to the district court, indicating that
further development of the record was necessary.59 A Second Circuit case6
involving the same issues is also poised for Supreme Court review. ,
Therefore, this issue may come before the Court in the near future,
giving the Court another opportunity to decide whether it is pursuing a
federalism revolution.
IV.

TAKINGS

I would like to briefly mention another area of law that does not
strictly involve issues of federalism, but does apply to all government
regulation of water and the environment. The central question is whether

the government has the right to reduce water rights for public purposes
(e.g., protecting endangered species or protecting public trust uses)

without paying compensation to the water user whose right is reduced.
This involves potential conflicts, not between governments, but between
government and individuals.
Under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, the government must

pay compensation to property owners when it "takes" their property for
public use.'6, In recent years, the Supreme Court has held that in some
instances the government must pay property owners when it regulates a

property right." This is called the "regulatory takings doctrine." This
issue is distinct from the one recently receiving media attention, which
involves governmental power to take private property for economic
development. That was the issue decided in Kelo v. City of New

57.
58.
59.
6o.

S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukkee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, S. Fla.Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626).
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. at 112.
Catskill Mts. Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.

2001).

61. "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. Const.
amend. V.
62. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (20o5); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U'S. 374
(1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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London." There, the issues were whether economic development is a
public use and whether government can take the property if it provides
compensation.6 The question that arises in regulatory takings cases, and
especially in the water context, is not whether there is a public use (such
takings are almost invariably for public benefit, e.g., protecting
endangered species), but whether the property can be taken without
payment of compensation.
The first question that arises in water regulatory takings cases is
whether the public or the private water user owns the water. If the public
owns the water, the public has the property right, and the public can do
whatever it wants with its property right. If that is the case, the private
user does not have a constitutionally protected property interest. If the
private user owns the water, then he does have the property right, and it
follows that he has the same rights as any other property owner and is
justified in asserting a takings claim. This question arose many years ago
in a case I handled before the California Supreme Court, which involved
6,
the question of whether the public trust doctrine applies to water rights.
The case arose out of the State's attempt to reduce the City of Los
Angeles' right to divert water from Mono Lake Basin and to send it
down to southern California.66
The California Supreme Court upheld the state's position. The court
held that the public trust doctrine does apply to water rights, and
therefore the State can reduce the amount of water that Los Angeles is
taking out of the Mono Lake Basin. Los Angeles filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court arguing that its
water rights had been unconstitutionally taken and it was entitled to
compensation. The Court denied the petition, likely not on the merits,
but because the California Supreme Court had remanded the matter to a
lower court and therefore there was no final state court decision. This is
still very much a live issue in California.
This issue has also recently arisen in two cases before the Court of
Federal Claims in Washington, D.C. In these cases, federal or state water
projects have reduced water deliveries to their customers in order to
provide more water for endangered species. The customers then argued
that their water was unconstitutionally taken and that they were entitled
to compensation. Each case was heard by a different judge and the
judges came to exactly opposite conclusions.
One case arose out of California and involved farmers in the Central

63.
64.
65.
66.

125 S. Ct. 2655 (2o05).
Id. at 2655-56.
Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).
Id. at 1051-52.
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Valley who had contracted for water from the State Water Project. 67 The
other case arose out of Oregon and involved farmers in Klamath who
have contract rights to water from the federal project in the Klamath
River Basin in Oregon.""
The factual outlines of the cases were essentially the same. In both
cases, the customers were farmers and had contracts that allowed them
to obtain water under the terms of the contract. In both cases, the federal
service agencies issued biological opinions under the ESA that required
the projects to reduce the amount of water deliveries to the customers in
order to provide more water for endangered fish. The biological opinions
required the reallocation of water from the farmers to the endangered
fish.
In the California case, Judge John Paul Wiese held that the federal
government does have the right to reallocate the water, but that it has to
pay compensation to the farmers for the loss of their rights. In his view,
the farmers had a contract, which created a property right. Therefore,
when the federal government requires that right to be reduced for some
public purpose (in this case, protecting endangered species), the farmers
have lost something of value. As a result, they have lost a property
right
69
and are entitled to just compensation under the Takings Clause.
In the Oregon case, Judge Francis Allegra also held that the federal
government has the right to reallocate the water. However, he held that
the government does not have to pay compensation to the farmers for
the loss of their rights. In his view, the contracts created no property
rights. A contract is no more than a contract; it gives rights and
expectations but does not create property. Therefore, a contract does not
automatically create a property right or the ability to assert a takings
claim.7"
These two judges fundamentally disagree on the question of whether
the government has to pay compensation to people like the farmers, who
have contracts for the delivery of water that are interfered with in order
to provide more water for endangered fish. This question is critically
important in water law today because it may determine whether
government can effectively regulate water. If the government has to pay
a water user every time it regulates and/or reduces rights, then the
government is will be very cautious before promulgating any regulation.
Protecting endangered species is an admirable cause, but governments
may think differently if their budgets are exposed to multi-million dollar
takings claims. On the other hand, water users argue that, as a matter of
67. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed CI. 246 (2003).
68. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. CI. 504 (2005).
69. Tulare, 59 Fed. Cl. at 246.
70. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 515.
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simple fairness, the burdens of these regulations should be placed on the
entire public because the public benefits from the protection of
endangered fish.
This a very fundamental question. I do not know what the outcome
will be, but I predict that the Supreme Court will be compelled to
address this water law issue in the years ahead.
CONCLUSION

What does all this mean? First, I think that we are on verge of some
major developments in water law, both in terms of the balance between
federal and state power to regulate water and whether government has
to pay for regulating water. These issues are very important and affect
the entire nation. Therefore, I think the Supreme Court will have to
address them. Of course, the Court is already planning to address one of
these questions in the wetlands case that I mentioned."
Second, the longer I work in water law the more I become aware of
how water laws change as our public needs change. Therefore, I warn
those of you who are about to enter this area of law, that it is not one in
which the rules are fixed for all eternity. These rules are dynamic and
flexible and change as our water needs change. When I started in this
field many years ago, I naively thought that there was a discrete set of
issues that I could put in a box and that, once I got the answers to these
questions, the rules would be set for future generations. Then all I would
have to do is take these well-settled principles and apply them to the
facts of individual cases. Now, I see that it is not that way at all and that
the rules and laws will continue to change as our needs continue to
change in the future. I pass on to the students in attendance this very
hard-earned lesson that has taken me a career to learn: No matter how
hard you try, you will not be able to solve all legal problems in your
lifetime.
Third, to all the students in the audience, I do have an ulterior
purpose in providing the perspective of a former government lawyer. It is
to encourage you to at least think about pursuing a career in government
and public law. If you do, I can promise you that you will not find
yourself in the distant future wallowing in riches and thinking about
which vacation home you are going to visit next summer, but you will
have the satisfaction of knowing that you represent the people, in the
broadest sense, on matters of great importance to you. Government is
the one institution in our society that is charged with the function of
representing everybody. Government is often criticized about how it
performs that function-perhaps justly so, but nonetheless that is its
7.

Feb.

21,

Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
2oo6).

126

S. Ct. 414 (argued,
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function. I do not for a moment discount the importance of lawyers who
represent more specific interests, whether environmental, property, or
otherwise. The legal profession is certainly a big tent that can
accommodate many different points of view. A government career does,
however, give you a perspective about public law that may be different
from that of other lawyers. As a result you may have the opportunity to
share that unique perspective with your peers, perhaps at future
conferences, as I have done today.
Thank you very much.
QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE

AUDIENCE MEMBER:

What is your sense of the future intersection of

groundwater law and the lack of regulation in California?
WALSTON: Groundwater regulation lies in California's future, at least
at some point. A lot of states, Arizona for example, which is also an
extremely arid state, have extensive groundwater programs. Our
population continues to grow in California and our water supplies remain
somewhat finite. If we do effect more storage projects to restore more
water, then I think the regulation of groundwater is almost unavoidable.
When that will happen, I do not know. It seems to me that it will have to
happen sometime in the future because of the importance of the issue.
PETER DOUGLAS:

I have been in public service for thirty-five years,

and this is the first time that I have had the opportunity to thank you for
the work that you have done. My name is Peter Douglas and I am the
Executive Director of the Coastal Commission. We have worked
together over the years and we have changed, but I still recognize you. I
want to publicly thank you for your dedication to public service and the
excellent representation you have provided all of us by protecting the
public's interest throughout your career. You have made a heck of a
difference. You are a very humble, modest person, but your morality,
your ethics, and your dedication to public ethics is something that I am
honored to publicly recognize.
WALSTON: For those who don't know, that is Peter Douglas, and his
position is Executive Director of the California Costal Commission. He
has held that position for many years. If memory serves, I think that
Peter is the third person to serve in that capacity. This does bring back
some wonderful memories that have nothing to do with water law, but do
have to do with coastal regulation. I had the privilege of being appointed
by the Attorney General to represent the Coastal Commission during its
formative years. A gentleman who has long since retired, named Carl
Bronchi, who is one of the greatest members I have ever served under,
and is a great public servant, served with me in that capacity. We
basically molded the law for California in the formative years of the
Coastal Commission. It was really a very exciting time, and Peter was
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there, as they say, "present at the Creation," and a great participant in
that as well.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You discussed a very interesting area of the law,
the intersection of state-based water allocation, the Endangered Species
Act and the Fifth Amendment. Do you have any opinion on the
appropriateness of the narrow Court of Claims being the first part of the
judiciary to tackle those issues?
WALSTON: I am not quite sure that I understand the question. What I
think you might be suggesting is that the Court of Claims has a very
limited function and jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction over claims for
damages against the United States. Theoretically, if you want to go into
court and enjoin the Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water Act or
anything else as it applies to you, the claim would have to be brought in a
federal district court. If you have no problem with the regulation itself
and wants to allow the federal government to regulate but simply wants
to be compensated for damages created by the regulation then you go to
the Court of Federal Claims. It is very interesting that some property
rights advocates have been making a choice in recent years about which
way they want to go. In other words, do they want to go to the federal
district courts, perhaps a federal district court in California, which would
then be appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which is very hostile to property
owner claims? Alternatively, the plaintiff may want to bring the action in
the Court of Federal Claims in the form of a claim for damages. The
decisions of the Court of Claims are appealed to the Federal Circuit in
Washington, D.C., allowing the parties to bypass the Ninth Circuit. It is
simply a choice, if you are a property owner and you want to develop
your property, and the government will not let you because you are
building over an endangered species habitat, you must make this choice.
This is the calculation that the individual property owner has to
make: (i) whether he wants the use of his property or he wants damages;
and (2) will he be better off by going through the appellate process back
in Washington, D.C. than he would in the Ninth Circuit? That is a
calculated decision that property advocates are making. I should hasten
to add that I have had some conversations with some well known
attorneys practicing in this field of law, and they have told me that this is
a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. The Ninth Circuit is
adverse to their claims in most cases, but the Federal Circuit is also
somewhat hostile to their claims. Attorneys are having slightly better
luck with the Court of Federal Claims, as witnessed by the decision I
mentioned by Judge Wiese.72 These are all calculations that you have to
take into account when you represent clients. Your clients may come to
you and say, "I heard Mr. Walston speak at this conference, and he told
72. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed CI. 246 (2003).
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me I have two choices. Tell me, which one will win?" That is a risky
determination given that you might lose either way, but that is the
calculation that property attorneys are undertaking.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is there a possibility that trade agreements like
NAFTA or GAP may limit the ability of the state to regulate water?
WALSTON: Absolutely, but in ways that we cannot yet anticipate.
That is an issue that has been lurking for a long time. Congress has not
come up with an answer yet. I am not sure what the answer is. I know
that the Supreme Court faces these questions every time that the United
States enters into a treaty with a foreign country. They did that, for
example, with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.73 The executive branch
entered into a treaty with Canada to protect endangered birds that flew
between Canada and the United States and back again.74 This created
treaty rights. The question was whether the treaty overrides state laws.
That question went to the Supreme Court, which held that the Treaty did
in fact override state law.75 I assume that the same would hold true today.
The treaty power rests up in the ether with the Congressional power,
and both of these powers override state law. The question which then
arises is more a political question than a legal one. Congress is concerned
about the impact on state laws, and as a result writes language into the
treaties that will protect state laws to some degree. To the extent that
there are conflicts, however, we all know that the Supremacy Clause will
govern. Under the Supremacy Clause, the treaty power of the federal
government overrides state laws without question. Additionally, there is
no question that the Commerce Clause clearly overrides state laws. The
question that is raised in the cases I mentioned is whether congressional
enactments are within the scope of the Commerce Clause. That is the
the
question that was
76 before the Supreme Court on February 21 in
Rapanos matter.

73. i6 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2oo6).

74. Id.
75. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. i8 (i9x9).
76. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 414 (argued, Feb. 21, 2006).

